Decision Styles

A decision style is a recurring way in which an agent, or several agents together, settle on one course of action among alternatives. A style is a composition: it combines who the agents are taken to be, which functions they exercise, how they interact, and which possibilities their situation offers. Other notes in this vault define each of these four parts, and this note assembles them. This note and its child notes list the decision styles that research has described. The list samples the space of possible styles as widely as the evidence allows: from nonliving systems whose standing as decision-makers is disputed, through cells, plants, animals and human institutions, to machines, composites of living tissue with machines, and proposed superintelligent systems. It includes contested findings, and it includes proposals that an experiment or an observation could test. The same styles recur in agents of different kinds. Bacteria, ant colonies, human assemblies and networks of computers, for example, all use quorums.

Decisions are widespread: all living beings make them, and some human technologies make them as well. One account of decisions in more-than-human worlds therefore asks for taxonomies of decision-making that cover all such agents.1 Reviews so far cover parts of the range. A review of continual decision-making across organisms builds no typology of styles.2 Reviewers of collective intelligence in animals, humans and machines report that no single account covers its forms yet.3 Other reviews compare two kinds of agent at a time, for example animal groups with human groups,4, 5 or they cover robot swarms6 or mixed groups of people and machines.7

The list supports an inclusive account of design. If design is a capacity to cope with novelty that humans share with other beings,8 then design proceeds through many decision styles, and the design professions use a few of them. Design theory uses the word pluriverse for a world in which many worlds fit.9 In that sense, the list describes a pluriverse of decision styles.

This note states how a style composes, which kinds of agent the list samples and how the families of styles relate. The child notes give the styles, their uses and the terms of other fields:

  • Styles Settled by Assessment: one agent settles the choice from its present state, from a comparison of values, from a stored record or from a forecast.
  • Styles Settled by Variation: trials, variants, chance or newly made options settle the choice.
  • Styles Settled Among Parties: several parties settle the choice when they pool, lead, adjust or refuse.
  • Hybrid Collectives: how control and refusal pass where people decide with other species and places, and where engineers join living bodies with machines.
  • Implications: the use of the list for the comparison of traditions and policies, for more-than-human design and for nonhuman leadership.
  • Existing Terms: the terms that fields already use for decision styles, which the lists adopt wherever one exists.
  • Grounding: the published schemes from which each kind of agent and each family derives, the parts that are new or contingent in this list, and the places where empirical work or design experiments should focus.

Related notes:

How a Style Composes

A decision style is a composition of four parts. Other notes define the parts, so this section states only what each part contributes to a style. Each part can be disputed. The parts follow an order. Identity comes first, because an identity, a boundary and a self define the agent. Functions then belong to that agent, and interactions occur between agents that are so defined. The possibility landscape is the context of all three. The first step stays open to revision, because functions and interactions can give reasons to redraw a boundary (Agency). Cockroaches, for example, treated robots that wore their odour as members of the group,10 and an immune system admits some microbes into the community of a body's cells.11

  • Identity: who decides. A statement about a style has to declare its agent, with the boundary and the self that define it, because nature supplies no default level (Agency). Outside observers posit an agent, and the agent posits itself, so the parties to one decision can describe its decider differently.12 Accounts of biological individuality distinguish kinds of individual that can separate: in one account a honeybee hive is the agential individual, and each worker is an organism.13 Agent, Biological Individuality and Agentic Stair outline the candidate kinds and levels.
  • Functions: what the declared agent does. A style combines several of the functions in Functional Account of Agency, such as memory, communication and refusal. Researchers sometimes call these activities mechanisms of decision-making. This note avoids that word, because ethology separates the survival value of a behaviour, often called its function, from its causation, often called its mechanism.14 The note uses "means" for the way in which a particular agent performs a function. Bacteria detect a quorum through the concentration of a signalling molecule.15 Honeybee scouts detect a quorum when about 20 to 30 of them are present at one site, and how they sense that number remains unknown.16
  • Interactions: how agents stand toward each other. Relations are directed, a third party often mediates or profits, and roles shift (Agentic Stair, Deliberation). A style states who proposes, who filters the proposals and who can refuse with effect.
  • Possibility landscape: what the situation permits. Design Potential (Private) describes the futures that are admissible at a place, the adjacent possible that earlier events opened or closed, and the part that each agent registers and aims at. A style states whether agents select among given options, sample them or make new ones, and how the outcome changes what is reachable later. Outcomes persist as traces in bodies and surroundings.2

The three groups of families follow from this composition. In the assessment group, the functions of one declared agent settle the choice. In the variation group, the relation of the agents to the possibility landscape settles it: the agents sample the landscape, draw from it or extend it. In the interaction group, the relations among agents settle it. Identity decides the level of description. When an observer redraws the boundary, a quorum among bees becomes the threshold switch of one colony.

  • A decision. Decision Making gives the general definition: a system changes its state or behaviour in response to information from its surroundings. Accounts of basal cognition add that a decision combines information from several sources and leads to action, usually toward a goal.17 A narrower account of continual decision-making sets three criteria: constraints from past outcomes accumulate and cannot be reversed, the selection of actions is flexible, and changes of regulation that depend on history persist. Its authors apply the criteria to a subset of decision strategies. They exclude stimulus-response behaviour and homeostatic adaptation, they state that centralised neural decisions may exceed the account, and they leave out evaluation by internal goals.2 This note uses the wider definitions and treats the three criteria as one test among several.
  • A style. A style is a pattern that recurs across decisions. The pattern covers which functions take part, where the record of earlier decisions is kept, how alternatives arise, how one alternative prevails, and who takes part. One agent can use several styles. A honeybee swarm (Apis mellifera), for example, sends scouts to sample nest sites, compares the sites through recruitment, and commits through a quorum.16
  • Tests and evidence. Each style has a test that could fail. Three tests apply to many styles: erase the trace of earlier decisions, alter the surroundings, or set the agent's history in conflict with an immediate reward, and observe whether the choice changes.2 Entries marked "proposed" are hypotheses with a stated test. Entries marked "contested" have evidence that other researchers dispute. Entries marked "model" report results from a mathematical or computational model. Unmarked entries report experiments, field observations or reviews of them.

A description of a style uses the fields that Functional Account of Agency sets for every function: declarations, conditions of exercise, evidence state, control and constraint, participation pathway, consequences, and refusal. The table adds the aspects that matter for decisions in particular. Organisational scale runs from gene, regulatory network and cell, through organism, social group and population, to ecosystem, biosphere and institution.

AspectWhat to recordTerms in use
Identity
ParticipantsOne body, many agents of one kind, several kinds of agent, human institutions, machinesConsensus and combined decisions18
Organisational scaleThe level at which the choice is made, and the levels that it affectsPattern and scale19
LegibilityWhether human institutions can register the decisionLegibility20
Interactions
ControlHow far influence over the outcome is concentrated, how leadership arises, and how long it lastsControl skew;21 hierarchical and heterarchical control;2 emergence, distribution and power of leadership;22 persistence8
InformationWhether participants pool information locally or across the whole groupScale of information pooling21
ConsequencesWho gains and who paysPower, reach, accountability, fairness and beneficial consequences1
Possibility landscape
OptionsWhether the style selects among given options or makes new onesDesign potential8
Spatial scaleThe reach of sensing, the reach of action and the reach of consequencesPattern and scale19
Temporal scaleThe time needed to decide, the time for which the outcome binds, and how often the agent revisits the decisionSpeed–accuracy trade-off;23 timescale separation24
ReversibilityWhether the agent or another party can undo the outcomeLock-in and path dependency;25 interventions that can be withdrawn26
ExposureWhich human actions disrupt the style, including a mismatch between the scale of a decision and the scale of managementSocial-ecological mismatch27

The Families

The styles fall into eleven families, grouped by how one option comes to prevail. Three groups order the families: assessment by one agent, variation with selection, and interaction among parties. The section on composition states why. The families describe patterns and do not rank agents. Most agents use styles from several families.

FamilyHow one option prevailsStylesMain disagreement
Assessment
Regulating and switchingA variable leaves its range, a gradient changes or a signal crosses a thresholdSet-point regulation; gradient tracking; threshold switch; evidence accumulation; anticipation from a cue; growth allocation; developmental target-seekingWhether regulation counts as a decision
Valuing and choosingAn agent compares given options and takes oneValue comparison; satisficing and simple rules; state-dependent choice; uncertainty monitoringWhether agents maximise; whether opting out shows knowledge of uncertainty
Following what is storedAn inherited rule, a habit, a memory, a tradition or a written rule settles the choiceInherited rule; habit and routine; own memory; copying others; tradition and culture; written rule and precedentWhether plants learn; how strong the evidence for some animal traditions is
Anticipating and planningAn agent evaluates outcomes before it actsPlanning with an internal model; formal analysis; robust and precautionary choice; active inference; convergent instrumental goals (proposed)Whether choice needs an internal model
Variation
Trying, hedging and selectingAn agent or a population tries several responses and keeps those that workTrial and error; exploration and sampling; selection among variants; bet-hedging and diversificationWhether selection is a form of learning
Using chance and outside signsA random draw or an outside sign selects the optionRandomising; divination and omens; chance meetingsWhether a draw is a decision or the absence of one
Making optionsAn agent builds, alters or invents, and the options changeConstruction that changes options for others; individual innovation; building by local rules; design reasoning; generative search with models and prototypes; supported construction across kinds of agentWho counts as a designer
Interaction
Pooling among manyMany agents contribute, and no member decides aloneQuorum; recruitment and cross-inhibition; alignment with neighbours; voting and averaging; deliberation; stigmergy; exchange and prices; synchronised timingWhen a pool outperforms its best member; who may decide for a wider public
Leading and delegatingOne agent or a few agents decide for manyDominance; leadership granted by followers; representation and guardianship; expert judgement; delegation to automated systems; ceding to other species and processesWhether those who are led can correct the leader
Adjusting between partiesParties with different interests respond to each other until an arrangement standsPartner choice and sanctions; reciprocity; mutual adjustment; contest; signals across species; steering another's choiceWhere communication ends and manipulation begins
Refusing and leavingAn agent declines, departs or blocksAvoidance and non-use; exit and dispersal; resistance; veto and consentWhether non-use shows refusal; whether a refusal changes the outcome

The Range of Agents

Three notes already outline kinds of agent, and this note builds on them. Agent lists types of agent with examples and with the standing of each claim, Biological Individuality lists levels from gene to biosphere, and Agentic Stair gives candidates, tests and cautions for kinds from abiotic processes to artificial intelligence systems. Maps and Taxonomies of Agents compares the published maps and taxonomies of agents. The kinds are strata for sampling and no typology. Every agent is a composite, and one body belongs to several agents at once.12, 28

The table shows how far the lists of styles cover those kinds. A filled circle means that at least one cited case reports an experiment, an observation or a review. An open circle means that the lists have only proposals, contested findings, models or comparisons. An empty cell means that the lists have no case. A case appears in the row of the unit that its source treats as the decider, so a honeybee swarm appears under colonies.

Kind of agentRegulatingValuingStoredPlanningTryingChanceMakingPoolingLeadingAdjustingRefusing
Abiotic processes and prebiotic chemistry○○○○○○
Genes and regulatory networks●
Cells and microbes●●●●●●●
Tissues, organs and immune systems●○●○●
Plants and fungi●●●○●●●○
Animals as single organisms●●●●●●●○●
Families and social groups●●●●●
Colonies, holobionts and symbiotic partners●●●●●●
Populations, species and lineages●●●
Communities and cultures●●
Ecosystems and landscapes○●
The biosphere, or Gaia○
Human individuals and institutions●●●●●●●●●
People with other species and places●●●○●●●
Technologies, infrastructures and artificial intelligence systems○●○●●●●
Composites of living bodies and machines●○○●●●●●●
Proposed superintelligence○○○○○

The columns stand for the eleven families. Empty cells mark places to search before they mark limits of the agents: the lists have few cases for immune systems, organs, communities and whole ecosystems, and none in which a technology leads, adjusts or refuses on its own. Agent gives examples for each kind and states the standing of the claim that such agents decide, from abiotic matter, where the claim is disputed, to superintelligent systems, which are a forecast.29

Scales Across the Families

The table summarises the scales of the cases that the child notes cite. A narrow entry can reflect the limits of research as well as the limits of a style.

FamilyOrganisational scaleSpatial reachTime to decide and time the outcome bindsMemory kept inControl
Regulating and switchingRegulatory network, cell, tissue, organism, colony; ecosystem and biosphere (proposed)Micrometres to the extent of a root system or myceliumSeconds to seasons; a switch or a grown form can bind for lifeBodyWithin one body or one colony, often spread among its parts
Valuing and choosingCell, organism, institutionThe range that the agent samplesSeconds to hours for most choices; longer for growth and for formal analysisBody; documents in organisationsOne agent
Following what is storedCell, organism, social group, population, institutionHome range, migration route, jurisdictionFast to apply; binds for a lifetime, for generations or for centuriesBody, surroundings, culture, documentsThe past: earlier selection, earlier members, earlier rulings
Anticipating and planningOrganism, institution, machineAs far as the model reachesHours to years; plans and built works bind for decadesBody, models, documentsThe holder of the model
Trying, hedging and selectingCell, organism, population, lineage, ecosystem, institution, machineAnyOne trial to many generationsBody, variation in a population, recordsSpread across trials or variants
Using chance and outside signsCell, organism, institutionAnyInstant for a draw; longer for omens and meetingsNone for a draw; culture for the reading of omensNo agent
Making optionsOrganism, social group, multispecies community, institutionNest to river valleyHours to centuries; structures outlast buildersBody, surroundings, culture, modelsBuilders first, then users
Pooling among manyCell, social group, population, multispecies community, institution, machineColony, group range, forest, electorateSeconds to days, and years for mast seeding; traces last from one year to the nextSignals, surroundings, recordsSpread among members
Leading and delegatingSocial group, multispecies community, institution, machineGroup range to jurisdictionFast in animal groups, slower in institutions; persists across many decisionsLeaders, records, codeOne agent or a few
Adjusting between partiesCell, organism, social group, multispecies community, institutionWhere the ranges of the parties overlapRepeated over seasons and generationsBodies, cultureSplit between parties, often unequally
Refusing and leavingCell, organism, social group, population, institutionSite to rangeImmediate to generationsBody; documents for consent proceduresThe agent that refuses, if the other party heeds the signal

Overlaps and Incompatibilities

The families provide a vocabulary for the description of a case, and one case can belong to several families. The child notes record overlaps and disputes for each family. Five patterns recur.

  • Fuzzy edges. Most cases combine several styles, as the honeybee swarm shows. A threshold switch that fires at random in each cell becomes bet-hedging in the population. A slime trail is a memory for the slime mould that left it and a trace for others.
  • Nesting. A style at one level consists of other styles at the level below. A colony of rock ants (Temnothorax albipennis) accumulates evidence for a nest site through the recruitment and the quorums of its workers.23, 30 The tissues of a body reach a target form through the activity of many cells, which one account describes as a collective intelligence.31 Research on individual decisions and research on collective decisions use different terms for the same trade-off between speed and accuracy, and one review proposes three parameters for a decision at either level: delay, risk and accuracy.32 The style that an observer records therefore depends on the boundary that the observer declares, and a second plausible boundary is a useful check (Agentic Stair).
  • One process, two descriptions. Some styles redescribe others, and researchers dispute whether the redescription adds anything. The list records evolving lineages as selection among variants, and some authors describe the same process as learning.33, 34 The list records regulation as a set point, and one theory describes it as action that reduces the gap between predicted states and sensed states.35
  • Substitution. Styles can replace each other. After long training, a habit replaces fresh evaluation.36 A lower bound on evidence buys speed at the cost of accuracy.23 Bodies with fixed connections and collectives of moving members process distributed information in different ways: one review contrasts "solid" plants with "liquid" ant colonies.37
  • Incompatibility. Some styles undermine others in the same place. In a model, shared decisions usually cost group members less than the decisions of a despot.38 A written rule can displace the judgement that it encoded: a hunting closure of fixed length replaced the judgement of Gwich'in hunters about when the lead caribou had passed.39 Control that narrows the natural variation of a managed system removes the variants on which trying and hedging depend, and the system loses resilience.40 A steering party uses a cue that triggers a rule, so it can bypass the evaluation on which consent depends; an ecological trap is the extreme case.41 Representation and refusal can diverge, because a guardian can speak for a river and still lack any means to stop a dam.42 Styles also differ in tempo: trees, beetles and microorganisms answered one project at different tempos.43

Three disagreements concern the list as a whole.

  • Where decisions begin. Agency orders seven rungs from persistence and attraction, through regulation and adaptivity, to goal-directed, collective and representational agency, and it notes that an attractor requires no agent. The range table reports four positions on abiotic matter and a typology that excludes bacteria. The list keeps such cases and marks them as comparisons, proposals or contested findings.
  • Rank or profile. Several schemes rank agents. One orders four types of psychological agency along the human lineage, from goal-directed vertebrates to socially normative humans.44 Another orders all systems by the kind of control to which they respond.12 This list records how a choice is settled, in line with the function profiles of Functional Account of Agency, so one agent can combine styles from several rungs.
  • One account or many. The reviews of continual decision-making and of collective intelligence doubt that one account will cover all cases.2, 3 The list does not unify the styles. It gives them one format, so that fields can compare cases while their accounts stay distinct.

Open Questions

  • Which styles do design research, other research traditions and policies support? Which styles do they ignore or undermine? Implications describes the comparison.
  • Do nonliving systems select flexibly? One hypothesis in physics proposes that driven systems of many particles tend to take forms that absorb and dissipate work from the drive, so that they appear adapted to it.45 Droplets follow gradients through a maze.46 The three tests of history, trace and surroundings could show whether such systems do more than respond.
  • Do present programs confirm the predictions about superintelligent agents? One prediction states that agents with many different final goals will pursue the same intermediate goals.29
  • One estimate puts information transmission among prokaryotes alone at about 1024 bits per second, compared with about 1015 bits per second of internet traffic in 2022.47 Which share of that exchange enters decisions that affect shared places?
  • Can observers identify a style from behaviour alone when several means produce the same pattern?
  • How do styles combine and conflict in one place, for example a tradition of migration and a plan for a road?
  • Which entries reflect the agents and which reflect the record? Research on decisions concentrates on a few species, so an empty entry for fungi or insects can describe the literature.

References


Subnotes
  1. Existing Terms
  2. Grounding
  3. Hybrid Collectives
  4. Implications
  5. Styles Settled Among Parties
  6. Styles Settled by Assessment
  7. Styles Settled by Variation

Footnotes

  1. Roudavski, Stanislav, and Douglas Brock. “From Dingoes to AI: Who Makes Decisions in More-than-Human Worlds?” TRACE ∴ Journal for Human-Animal Studies 11 (2025): 56–96. https://doi.org/10.23984/fjhas.145720.˄

  2. Severs, Liberty, and Qiuran Wang. “Continual Decision-Making Dynamics across Biological Organisms.” Biological Reviews 101, no. 3 (2026): 1059–72. https://doi.org/10.1002/brv.70115.˄

  3. Seabright, Edmond, Sarah Alami, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Cathal O’Madagain, Jose Segovia-Martin, Paul E. Smaldino, James Winters, and Andrew Whiten. “The Evolutionary Past and Future of Collective Intelligence: Introduction to the Theme Issue.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 381, no. 1948 (2026): 20240439. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2024.0439.˄

  4. Conradt, Larissa, and Christian List. “Group Decisions in Humans and Animals: A Survey.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364, no. 1518 (2009): 719–42. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0276.˄

  5. Kameda, Tatsuya, Wataru Toyokawa, and R. Scott Tindale. “Information Aggregation and Collective Intelligence beyond the Wisdom of Crowds.” Nature Reviews Psychology 1, no. 6 (2022): 345–57. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-022-00054-y.˄

  6. Valentini, Gabriele, Eliseo Ferrante, and Marco Dorigo. “The Best-of-n Problem in Robot Swarms: Formalization, State of the Art, and Novel Perspectives.” Frontiers in Robotics and AI 4 (2017): 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2017.00009.˄

  7. Tsvetkova, Milena, Taha Yasseri, Niccolo Pescetelli, and Tobias Werner. “A New Sociology of Humans and Machines.” Nature Human Behaviour 8, no. 10 (2024): 1864–76. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02001-8.˄

  8. Roudavski, Stanislav, and Alexander Holland. “Are You Blocking Nonhuman Leadership? Five Questions to Find Out.” In PDC ’26: Proceedings of the 19th Participatory Design Conference, vol. 2, edited by Laura Galluzzo, Anna Meroni, Daniela Selloni, Davide Fassi, Daniela de Sainz, Andrea Botero, Stefana Broadbent, et al., 372–81. New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1145/3789492.3796416.˄

  9. Escobar, Arturo. Designs for the Pluriverse: Radical Interdependence, Autonomy, and the Making of Worlds. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.˄

  10. Halloy, José, Grégory Sempo, Gilles Caprari, Colette Rivault, Masoud Asadpour, Fabien Tâche, Imen Saïd, et al. “Social Integration of Robots into Groups of Cockroaches to Control Self-Organized Choices.” Science 318, no. 5853 (2007): 1155–58. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144259.˄

  11. Gilbert, Scott F., Jan Sapp, and Alfred I. Tauber. “A Symbiotic View of Life: We Have Never Been Individuals.” The Quarterly Review of Biology 87, no. 4 (2012): 325–41. https://doi.org/10.1086/668166.˄

  12. Levin, Michael. “Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere: An Experimentally-Grounded Framework for Understanding Diverse Bodies and Minds.” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16 (2022): 768201. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2022.768201.˄

  13. Mann, Rebecca Catherine. “Complex Individuality: The Spatial, Temporal, and Agential Dimensions of the Problem of Biological Individuality.” PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2026.˄

  14. Tinbergen, Nikolaas. “On Aims and Methods of Ethology.” Zeitschrift Für Tierpsychologie 20, no. 4 (1963): 410–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.1963.tb01161.x.˄

  15. Waters, Christopher M., and Bonnie L. Bassler. “Quorum Sensing: Cell-to-Cell Communication in Bacteria.” Annual Review of Cell and Developmental Biology 21, no. 1 (2005): 319–46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.cellbio.21.012704.131001.˄

  16. Seeley, Thomas D. Honeybee Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.˄

  17. Lyon, Pamela, Fred Keijzer, Detlev Arendt, and Michael Levin. “Reframing Cognition: Getting down to Biological Basics.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376, no. 1820 (2021): 20190750. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0750.˄

  18. Conradt, Larissa, and Timothy J. Roper. “Consensus Decision Making in Animals.” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 20, no. 8 (2005): 449–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2005.05.008.˄

  19. Levin, Simon A. “The Problem of Pattern and Scale in Ecology: The Robert H. MacArthur Award Lecture.” Ecology 73, no. 6 (1992): 1943–67. https://doi.org/10.2307/1941447.˄

  20. Scott, James C. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.˄

  21. Ross-Gillespie, Adin, and Rolf Kümmerli. “Collective Decision-Making in Microbes.” Frontiers in Microbiology 5 (2014): 54. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2014.00054.˄

  22. Smith, Jennifer E., Sergey Gavrilets, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Paul L. Hooper, Claire El Mouden, Daniel Nettle, Christoph Hauert, et al. “Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff.” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 31, no. 1 (2016): 54–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2015.09.013.˄

  23. Franks, Nigel R., Anna Dornhaus, Jon P. Fitzsimmons, and Martin Stevens. “Speed versus Accuracy in Collective Decision Making.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 270, no. 1532 (2003): 2457–63. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2527.˄

  24. Szerszynski, Bronislaw. “Infrastructuring as a Planetary Phenomenon: Timescale Separation and Causal Closure in More-than-Human Systems.” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 47, no. 4 (2022): 193–214.˄

  25. Goldstein, Jenny E., Benjamin Neimark, Brian Garvey, and Jacob Phelps. “Unlocking ‘Lock-in’ and Path Dependency: A Review across Disciplines and Socio-Environmental Contexts.” World Development 161 (2023): 106116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106116.˄

  26. Roudavski, Stanislav. “The Case for Nonhuman Leadership.” Interactions 33, no. 6 (2026): 64–67. https://doi.org/10.1145/3849465.˄

  27. Beever, Erik A., Daniel Simberloff, Sarah L. Crowley, Robert Al-Chokhachy, Hazel A. Jackson, and Steven L. Petersen. “Social–Ecological Mismatches Create Conservation Challenges in Introduced Species Management.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 17, no. 2 (2019): 117–25. https://doi.org/10.1002/fee.2000.˄

  28. Clawson, Wesley P., and Michael Levin. “Endless Forms Most Beautiful 2.0: Teleonomy and the Bioengineering of Chimaeric and Synthetic Organisms.” Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 139, no. 4 (2023): 457–86. https://doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blac073.˄

  29. Bostrom, Nick. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.˄

  30. Pratt, Stephen C., Eamonn B. Mallon, David J. T. Sumpter, and Nigel R. Franks. “Quorum Sensing, Recruitment, and Collective Decision-Making during Colony Emigration by the Ant Leptothorax albipennis.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 52, no. 2 (2002): 117–27. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00265-002-0487-x.˄

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  34. Vanchurin, Vitaly, Yuri I. Wolf, Mikhail I. Katsnelson, and Eugene V. Koonin. “Toward a Theory of Evolution as Multilevel Learning.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119, no. 6 (2022): e2120037119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2120037119.˄

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  38. Conradt, Larissa, and Timothy J. Roper. “Group Decision-Making in Animals.” Nature 421, no. 6919 (2003): 155–58. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature01294.˄

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