Grounding
This note states where the kinds of agent and the families of decision styles in Decision Styles come from. For each kind and each family, it records three things: the published schemes and bodies of research from which the entry derives, the part that is new or contingent in this list, and the places where empirical work or design experiments should focus. The review in More-than-Human Participation (Review) uses the kinds and the families as rows of its comparison, so their grounding decides what the comparison can show.
The lists adopt published terms wherever such terms exist (Existing Terms), and every style cites research on its cases. The arrangement of those terms into kinds, families and groups is the work of this list. Other arrangements are possible. Maps and Taxonomies of Agents compares the published maps and taxonomies of agents.
Kinds of Agent
The seventeen kinds are strata for sampling. They combine units from several published schemes: levels of biological organisation, collectives, institutions, artefacts and composites. No published map covers all of them (Maps and Taxonomies of Agents). The table follows the rows of the coverage table in Decision Styles.
| Kind of agent | Derives from | New or contingent in this list | Where work should focus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abiotic processes and prebiotic chemistry | The axis of persuadability, which counts a circuit with a set point as a minimal goal-directed system;1 a taxonomy that counts biochemicals and thermostats as active agents;2 proposals on driven matter3 and on chemical systems that preserve themselves4 | Contested. One account restricts choice to living beings and some technical systems.5 Another requires biological self-regulation for a decision.6 The list keeps these systems as comparisons and proposals | Tests of history, trace and surroundings on droplets, materials and driven systems |
| Genes and regulatory networks | Reviews of cellular decision-making, which describe genetic switches;7, 8 the architecture of competent parts, which gives molecular networks a problem space of their own;9 the evolutionary-agential concept of the individual, which applies to genes and cells and requires no cognition10 | The cited reviews treat the cell as the decider. The network as a unit is a choice of this list. One review describes selfish genetic elements that gain at the cost of the organism that carries them11 | The list has cases in one family only |
| Cells and microbes | The toolkit of basal cognition, whose capacities occur in prokaryotes;12 autonomy theory, which counts living cells as agents;13 a definition of agency that a swimming bacterium satisfies14 | Contested from two sides. One typology denies psychological agency to the earliest bacteria,15 and one critique rejects biological agency for organisms without complex nervous systems16 | Planning, making options, leading and adjusting, for which the list has no cases in cells |
| Tissues, organs and immune systems | The levels between cell and organism in the architecture of competent parts;9 immune systems as intelligent agents17 and as liquid brains;18 a definition that lists metabolic, immune, neural and social scales of autonomy;14 an account of the agential individual in which cells, tissues and immune cells have control processes of their own19 | Contested. One account of organismal agency reserves agency for the whole organism and excludes parts such as hearts20 | Organs and immune systems as deciders, for which the list has few cases |
| Plants and fungi | Autonomy theory, which counts the growth of a plant toward light as agency;13 the five levels of agency, which place plant development at the ontogenetic level;21 research on judgement and decision-making in plants22 | The ladder of psychological agency leaves plants and fungi unplaced15 | Tests that separate planning from anticipation by cue; evidence of refusal |
| Animals as single organisms | The tower of generate and test;23 the four types of psychological agency;15 the five levels of agency;21 the dimensions of animal consciousness24 | The schemes disagree about rank and profile. Research on decisions concentrates on few species | Taxa that research on decisions has rarely studied |
| Families and social groups | The survey of group decisions in humans and animals;25 the map of organismality, which places societies at high cooperation with considerable conflict;26 the account of autonomous groups27 | Whether the group decides or its members decide depends on the interest of the observer25 | Styles of variation in groups, for which the list has no cases |
| Colonies, holobionts and symbiotic partners | The map of organismality, which places colonies of honeybees;26 colonial individuals in the information theory of individuality;28 the holobiont;29 the account of autonomous groups, which counts colonies of bees and ants as likely group agents;27 an account in which the honeybee hive is the agential individual and each worker is an organism;19 policing and demarcation mechanisms as evidence that a collective evolves as one unit30 | Each case needs a check of whether regulation closes at the level of the collective (Agency). One paper argues that an animal can have microbes among its parts and reproduce as one species, and it leaves open whether holobionts are evolutionary individuals31 | Valuing and planning by colonies and partners, for which the list has no cases |
| Populations, species and lineages | An account of semiotic agency that lists populations among agents;32 a proposal that evolving lineages learn33 | Contested. A species fails even the minimal concept of agent,17 and one account finds evolutionary trends goal-directed and without agency34 | Whether selection in a lineage is a form of learning |
| Communities and cultures | Research on animal traditions35 and on customary rules in human communities36 | The maps compared in Maps and Taxonomies of Agents offer no class for a tradition or a culture as a decider. The kind is a choice of this list | Carriers of traditions, and cases beyond the two families that the list covers |
| Ecosystems and landscapes | An account that describes ecosystems as collective or distributed agents relative to scale;37 research on alternative stable states38 and on response diversity39 | Contested. Autonomy theory states that an ecosystem can have closure and still be no agent13 | Tests of whether regulation closes at the level of the ecosystem |
| The biosphere, or Gaia | Selection among persisting systems as a route to regulation at the scale of the planet;40 Gaia as a system that maintains itself;41 four stages of planetary intelligence42 | Proposed | Predictions that observation of the Earth system could test |
| Human individuals and institutions | The intentional concept of agent;17 the three elements of human agency;43 group agents such as universities and companies;27 the conditions under which a group is an agent44 | One taxonomy denies that organisations set their own goals2 | The styles that institutions ignore or undermine in other agents (Implications) |
| People with other species and places | Research on cooperation between people and wild animals;45 the political typology of domesticated, wild and liminal animals;46 legal persons such as rivers with guardians;47 studies of design by trees, for birds and with humans48 | The maps compared in Maps and Taxonomies of Agents treat single systems or groups of one kind. A composite of people with other species and places as one decider is a choice of this list | Cases in which the accounts of the parties about who decides differ from the account of a study |
| Technologies, infrastructures and artificial intelligence systems | The intelligent concept of agent, which comes from artificial intelligence;17 a taxonomy of autonomous agents that places software agents beside biological and robotic agents;49 machine behaviour at three scales;50 profiles of artificial agency51, 52 | Contested. Autonomy theory denies agency to artefacts,13 and one preprint places artificial systems at low agency53 | Whether any technology leads, adjusts or refuses on its own, for which the list has no cases |
| Composites of living bodies and machines | The option space of living machines;54 the table of new kinds of being;55 the robotic taxonomic key;56 the hybrid regions of the cognition spaces;53 three proposed routes through which humans and artificial intelligence could form one evolving individual, which their author calls speculative57 | Sharp boundaries between the kinds of composite cannot be drawn55 | Which part of a composite can stimulate or read which (Hybrid Collectives) |
| Proposed superintelligence | Three forms of superintelligence;58 the top levels of the agentic profiles, which describe full autonomy and full generality52 | A forecast | Checks of the predictions on present programs |
Families of Decision Styles
| Family | Derives from | New or contingent in this list | Where work should focus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulating and switching | Cybernetics, which describes purposeful behaviour as control through feedback;59 reviews of cellular decision-making;7, 8 the accumulation of evidence to a bound in neuroscience;60 the toolkit of basal cognition12 | The list counts regulation as a decision style. One account of continual decision-making excludes homeostatic adaptation,6 and the axis of persuadability counts a circuit with a set point as a minimal agent.1 The family also includes growth allocation and developmental target-seeking, which their sources treat apart | Tests of history, trace and surroundings on droplets, tissues and ecosystems. Design experiments that shift a gradient or a set point, such as temperature or moisture, and record the responses of occupants (Microclimate Design) |
| Valuing and choosing | Models of foraging in behavioural ecology;61 limited rationality and ecological rationality;62, 63 decision analysis;64 tests of consumer demand in animal welfare science;65 tests of uncertainty monitoring66 | The family joins cells, plants, animals, people and organisations. It does not assume that agents maximise. Whether an animal that opts out knows its own uncertainty is contested | Choice tests and demand tests with the occupants of designed places. Cases for tissues and for social groups, where the list has none |
| Following what is stored | Learning theory on habits;67 strategies of social learning;68 research on animal traditions;35, 69 the analysis of institutions and their rules;70 legibility in states71 | The list orders the styles by the place of the record: lineage, body, surroundings, culture and documents. It therefore puts inherited rules and written rules in one family. The cited sources treat them apart | The carriers of stored decisions before and after an intervention: old individuals, old structures and traces. Learning in plants, which is contested |
| Anticipating and planning | Experiments on planning in corvids;72, 73 decision analysis;64 decision-making under deep uncertainty;74 the free-energy principle;75 forecasts about artificial agents;58 the classification of behaviour by orders of prediction59 | The family places formal analysis by institutions beside planning by animals and by programs. Whether choice needs an internal model is open: the account of continual decision-making states that adaptive choice needs no internal representation6 | Tests that separate planning from anticipation by cue in plants, fungi and tissues. Checks of whether present programs pursue the intermediate goals that forecasts predict |
| Trying, hedging and selecting | Experiments on trial and error in a single-celled organism and in animals;76, 77 experimental evolution;78 bet-hedging and portfolio effects in ecology;79, 80 incremental policy-making;81 adaptive management, whose proponents distinguish it from trial and error82 | The family treats trial by one agent and selection in a lineage as one pattern. Some authors describe evolving lineages as systems that learn,33 and that proposal decides whether a lineage counts as an agent here | Prototypes that take the responses of occupants as their outcome. The variety that management removes, and response diversity in designed habitats |
| Using chance and outside signs | Noise in the decisions of cells;8 unpredictable escape in animals;83 random selection of participants in deliberative polls;84 augury among swidden farmers;85 the garbage can model of organisations86 | The grouping is a choice of this list, and the cited sources come from separate fields | The evidence is thin: one study of omens and one model of chance meetings. Experiments on whether a choice that follows an outside sign differs in outcome or in variety. Random allocation in design trials |
| Making options | Ecosystem engineering and niche construction;87, 88 research on animal innovation;89 self-organised building;90 theories of design reasoning;91, 92 studies of design by trees and for birds48, 93 | The list counts construction and innovation as decision styles because they change the options of others, in line with design potential.94 Who counts as a designer is disputed | Measures of the options that builders open and that their removal closes. Design experiments in which the construction of other species sets the brief |
| Pooling among many | Consensus decisions and combined decisions in animal groups;95 the survey of group decisions in humans and animals;25 quorum sensing and quorum responses;96, 97 stigmergy;98 prices as carriers of dispersed knowledge;99 agreement among computers and in robot swarms100, 101 | The family puts quorums, markets, stigmergy and deliberation under one heading, because in each many agents contribute and no member decides alone. Reviewers of collective intelligence report that no single account covers its forms yet102 | The group sizes and signal conditions that pooled decisions need in designed places. Mixed groups of animals, people and machines |
| Leading and delegating | Shared and unshared decisions in animal groups;103 the comparison of leadership across mammal societies;104 legal standing and guardianship for natural entities;105, 47 levels of automation;106 accounts of nonhuman leadership94, 107 | The family joins dominance, representation, delegation to machines and ceding to other species, because in each one agent or a few agents decide for many | Whether those who are led can correct the leader. Whether guardianship changes outcomes for the represented party. Cases in which other species lead design |
| Adjusting between parties | Partner choice and sanctions in mutualisms;108, 109 reciprocity;110 evolutionary game theory;111 agonistic pluralism;112 cooperation between people and wild animals;113 ecological traps114 | The family includes steering, in which one party triggers the rule of another. The line between communication and manipulation is open | Tests of whether the cue that a party follows matches the outcome for that party. Long records of cooperation between people and other species |
| Refusing and leaving | Animal geography on resistance;115, 116 monitoring of structures that target species do not use;117 range shifts under climate change;118 consent in animal-computer interaction;119 aversion to algorithms120 | The list treats refusal as a family of its own, in line with Functional Account of Agency, which records refusal for every function. Whether non-use shows refusal is open | Tests that separate absence from refusal. Arrangements that give a refusal effect, such as interventions that can be withdrawn107 |
The Arrangement as a Whole
- The three groups are a choice of this list. Assessment, variation and interaction follow from the composition of a style (Decision Styles). Published arrangements order the same styles in other ways. The tower of generate and test orders creatures by the place where candidate moves are generated and tested. Its four floors correspond to four styles of this list: selection among variants; trial and error; planning with an internal model; tradition and culture.23 The classification of behaviour separates feedback from prediction,59 as the families of regulating and of anticipating do. The survey of group decisions separates aggregate decisions from interactive decisions,25 as the families of pooling and of adjusting do.
- The list records profiles. The ladders in Maps and Taxonomies of Agents rank agents. This list records how a choice is settled, so one agent can use styles from several families.
- The arrangement is contingent. Another arrangement could order the styles by the place of the record, by scale or by the number of parties. The number of families and their names in plain words are choices of this list.
- Two tests can check the arrangement. Independent coders can assign the same cases, and their agreement shows whether the families separate. The clusters that emerge from the corpus of the review can be compared with the families, which shows whether the literature groups the styles in the same way.
Strategic Areas
The two tables point to five areas in which empirical work and design experiments would add most.
- Kinds with few cases. Four kinds have cases in few families: tissues, organs and immune systems; communities and cultures; ecosystems; the biosphere.
- Styles with thin evidence. The family of chance and outside signs has evidence from few studies. The evidence that non-use shows refusal is disputed.
- Tests that separate neighbours. Four pairs need tests that tell them apart: regulation and decision; anticipation by cue and planning; absence and refusal; communication and manipulation.
- Design experiments. Prototypes can take the responses of occupants as their outcome. Briefs can state the carriers, the numbers and the signal conditions that the decisions of occupants need (Implications).
- Measurements for maps. Most published maps of agents are schematic.121 Data on the reach of goals, on competence in a problem space and on profiles would let the review place kinds of agent with evidence.122
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