Styles Settled by Assessment
In the styles of this group, one agent settles the choice through an assessment of its own: of its present state, of the values of the options, of a stored record or of a forecast. The agent can be a cell, a body, a colony or an organisation, so the group includes collectives that act as one. Decision Styles defines the terms, the three evidence labels ("proposed", "contested", "model") and the range of agents from nonliving matter to proposed superintelligence. The other groups are Styles Settled by Variation and Styles Settled Among Parties. Each family below has a table of styles with tests and cases, followed by its composition (identity, functions, interactions and possibilities), its overlaps and its disputes.
Regulating and Switching
One body or one colony keeps a variable in range, follows a gradient or switches between states. Terms in use: homeostasis, chemotaxis, cell-fate decision, speed–accuracy trade-off, plasticity.
| Style | How one option prevails | Test | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Set-point regulation | The agent acts when a variable leaves its range and stops when the variable returns | Perturb the variable; does corrective action follow and then stop? | All cells;1 simple circuits with set points, which one scale of agency places between mechanical clocks and animals;2 the biosphere, if selection among persisting systems yields regulation at the scale of the planet (proposed),3 or if Gaia maintains itself as an autopoietic system (proposed)4 |
| Gradient tracking | The agent compares a signal over time and biases its movement toward better conditions | Reverse the gradient; does movement reverse after a lag that matches the agent's memory? | Escherichia coli swimming toward food;5 as nonliving comparisons, oil droplets that move along a pH gradient,6 droplets that travel through a maze along such a gradient,7 and decanol droplets that moved toward the stronger of two salt gradients8 |
| Threshold switch | A signal accumulates until a switch commits the agent to one of several states | Add or remove signal near the threshold; does the state flip and then persist? | Viruses that choose between dormancy and replication;9 bacteria that choose between dormancy and growth;9, 10 Venus flytraps (Dionaea muscipula) that count touches before they close and before they digest;11 ecosystems that shift between alternative stable states (proposed as a comparable case)12 |
| Evidence accumulation | The agent samples until the evidence for one option reaches a bound; a lower bound gives faster and less accurate choices | Raise the cost of delay; do choices become faster and less accurate? | Primate brains;13, 14 colonies of the rock ant Temnothorax albipennis (Leptothorax albipennis in the source) that choose a nest;15 the slime mould Physarum polycephalum, which chose worse food more often when it decided fast on a hard task, and whose competing flows of biomass may act like accumulating evidence (proposed)16 |
| Anticipation from a cue | An early cue triggers preparation for the condition that usually follows | Present the cue alone; does preparation follow? | E. coli that prepare for low oxygen when temperature rises;17 Physarum that met three cool, dry episodes at regular intervals and then slowed down at the time when the next episode was due;18 associative learning in plants (contested)19 |
| Growth allocation | A modular body grows more where returns are higher and less elsewhere | Enrich one patch; does growth shift toward it at the expense of other parts? | Plant roots;20, 21 pea plants (Pisum sativum) that prefer a variable nutrient supply only when the steady supply is too low;22 mycelia of the fungus Phanerochaete velutina that move to a new wood block when the block is large enough;23 Physarum networks that connect food sources by short routes24, 25 |
| Developmental target-seeking | The parts of a body adjust until the body reaches a target form, also after injury | Perturb the form; does the same target still arrive by another route? | Tissues that develop and regenerate, described as problem-solving by collectives of cells;2, 26 organisms assembled from stem cells of frog embryos (Xenopus laevis), which kept the shape that their builders gave them and closed lacerations;27 spheroids that grew from single cells of the adult human lung, moved by cilia and induced the repair of scratches in sheets of cultured human neurons28 |
- Composition.
- Identity: One body or one colony that keeps a variable in range. The cited cases draw that boundary around a regulatory network, a cell, a plant, a mycelium or a colony, and the style changes with the boundary: the switch of a colony consists of quorums among its workers.
- Functions: sensing and discrimination; valence; error detection; motivation and goals; memory; anticipation; development; and action.
- Interactions: None are required. Other agents enter as conditions that the agent senses.
- Possibilities: Reactive or anticipatory in the terms of Design Potential (Private): the agent responds to present conditions, or to cues that correlate with later ones, among options that its body and surroundings already offer. These styles leave no document. An observer can read them in bodies, for example in the spread of roots or the shape of a canopy, so pruning or clearing removes the record together with the form.
- Complications and overlaps. The styles of this family are parts of many others. A threshold switch that fires at random in each cell gives bet-hedging in the population. Evidence accumulation in a rock ant colony consists of recruitment and quorums among workers. Growth allocation resembles value comparison, because growth shifts toward the patch with the higher return. Anticipation from a cue prepares for one expected condition, and the planning family begins where an agent selects among forecasts. One account states that cells inside a body lack the autonomy of single-celled organisms,29 while accounts of developmental target-seeking describe the same cells as a problem-solving collective.26
- Controversies and incompatibilities. Researchers dispute whether regulation is a decision. The account of continual decision-making excludes homeostatic adaptation and simple regulatory control.29 The scale of persuadability counts a circuit with a set point as a minimal agent.2 The makers of self-moving oil droplets put the word "senses" in quotation marks and propose the droplets as a system for the study of minimal cognition (proposed).6 For tissues, critics argue that feedback mechanisms shaped by natural selection explain the results that others describe as goal-seeking (contested).30 Organisms assembled from frog cells bear little resemblance to existing organs or organisms,27 so their self-repair offers a test of the two readings. Within the family, speed and accuracy exclude each other, as the slime mould and the rock ants show.
Valuing and Choosing
An agent compares given options and takes one. Terms in use: optimal foraging, utility, bounded rationality, satisficing, heuristic, risk sensitivity, cognitive bias, metacognition, preference.
| Style | How one option prevails | Test | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Value comparison | The agent scores options in one currency and takes the best | Change the cost of one option; does choice shift as the currency predicts? | Foragers that should leave a patch when its return falls to the average for the habitat (model);31 Physarum that favours the more rewarding of two arms after sampling both;32 battery hens, in two experiments that used the theory of consumer demand to measure the value that hens put on access to litter;33 farm animals, in choice tests and in tests of how hard an animal will work for a resource;34 decision analysis in human organisations35, 36 |
| Satisficing and simple rules | The first option that passes a threshold wins, or one cue decides | Add better options after the threshold is met; does the search stop anyway? | Humans with limited time and information;37, 38 rules of thumb in other animals39 |
| State-dependent choice | Hunger, fear, mood or reserves change which option wins | Change the state and keep the options; does the choice reverse? | Honeybees that judge ambiguous odours as bad after shaking;40 prey that forgo food where predators are likely;41 pea plants that take risks when resources are low;22 humans who weigh losses more than gains42, 14 |
| Uncertainty monitoring | The agent declines to choose, or seeks information, when a choice is hard | Offer a way to opt out; does the agent use it more on hard trials? | Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) that declined a memory test when they had forgotten;43 honeybees that opt out of difficult discriminations;44 value-of-information analysis in conservation45 |
- Composition.
- Identity: One evaluator with a currency of its own: a cell, a plant, an animal or an organisation. Observers infer the currency from choices, so the agent's valuation and the observer's model of it can differ.
- Functions: orienting; sensing and discrimination; valence; motivation and goals; and information seeking.
- Interactions: Whoever sets the options, such as an experimenter, a keeper or a designer, shapes the choice without taking part in it.
- Possibilities: The agent selects among options that are present within the range that it registers, its Umwelt in the terms of Design Potential (Private). These styles give designers their most direct evidence: what an occupant uses, how often, and at what cost. The evidence has a limit, because an agent chooses only among the options on offer and within the range that it samples.
- Complications and overlaps. State-dependent choice joins this family to regulation, because hunger or fear switches the ranking. A satisficing rule applies a threshold to options. Uncertainty monitoring overlaps with exploration, where the agent seeks information, and with refusal, where the agent opts out. A value comparison between two parties becomes an exchange. Nonliving matter can produce the same pattern: a decanol droplet moved toward the stronger of two salt gradients.8 In human groups, the comparison can occur within one mind or through an arbiter that weighs the inputs of members by their accuracy.46
- Controversies and incompatibilities. Economics and psychology dispute whether agents maximise. Rational choice assumes that they do. Work on limited rationality states that humans stop at the first satisfactory alternative,37 and work on ecological rationality argues that a simple rule can suit its setting.38 Entries marked as models state what an optimal forager should do, and observed animals can differ. Researchers dispute whether an animal that opts out knows its own uncertainty: some argue that associative mechanisms explain every such result.44 The account of continual decision-making leaves evaluation by internal goals aside, so its criteria cannot define this family.29 One proposal about artificial agents states that more or less any level of intelligence could combine with more or less any final goal (proposed).47 If that is right, the styles of this family describe how an agent chooses and leave open what it values. The styles of this family are incompatible with steering when a cue triggers a rule before the agent compares anything.
Following What Is Stored
The past settles the choice through inherited rules, habits, memories, traditions or written rules. Terms in use: instinct, habit, routine, lock-in, path dependency, social learning, conformity, tradition, culture, taboo, precedent.
| Style | How one option prevails | Test | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inherited rule | Earlier selection in the lineage fixed the response, and the individual applies it | Rear the agent without experience; does the response still appear? | Blackcaps (Sylvia atricapilla) from central Europe, in which a new and inherited migration direction toward Britain spread within about thirty years;48 evolved habitat cues that mislead animals when humans change the setting49 |
| Habit and routine | Repetition fixes a response, which then proceeds without fresh evaluation | Remove the benefit; does the response continue? | Rats that, after extended training, kept performing a food-rewarded action when the reward had lost its value;50 routines in human organisations (model);51 lock-in of technologies and institutions52 |
| Own memory | The record of earlier outcomes, kept in the body or in traces outside it, directs the next choice | Erase the record; does performance drop? | Physarum that avoids its own slime trail;53 the plant Mimosa pudica, which kept a learned response for a month;54 two species of bacteria whose lasting chemical changes to a shared medium altered the outcome of their later competition, a memory kept outside the cells with no choice shown55 |
| Copying others | The agent adopts what others do or what their signals indicate | Seed a new behaviour in a few individuals; does it spread along social ties? | Great tits (Parus major) in Wytham Woods, England, that adopted the local majority's way of opening a feeder;56 birds that respond to the alarm calls of other species;57 birds that settle where others of their kind are present;58 plants that respond to volatile cues from neighbours;59 strategies for when to copy and whom to copy, which models predict and which one article compares with evidence from animals and humans60 |
| Tradition and culture | Socially learned choices persist across generations | Remove knowledgeable individuals, or move naive ones; is the choice lost or absent? | Humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) that spread lobtail feeding;61 sulphur-crested cockatoos (Cacatua galerita) that open bins in Sydney;62 Norwegian herring (Clupea harengus) that shifted their spawning grounds after a fishery removed older fish;63 bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis) and moose (Alces alces), whose translocated populations needed decades to learn to migrate;64 elephants, mostly African savannah elephants (Loxodonta africana), for which the evidence of traditions remains sparse and indirect;65 customary rules and taboos in human communities66 |
| Written rule and precedent | A recorded rule or an earlier ruling settles the case | Change the record; does the decision change with it? | Rules for shared resources;67 state planning that acts on standardised records;68 legal persons with appointed guardians69 |
- Composition.
- Identity: A decider that extends over time: a lineage, an individual with a history, a group with a tradition or a state with records. Earlier members and earlier selection take part in the present choice.
- Functions: memory; learning; communication; and membership tests.
- Interactions: Between generations, and between knowledgeable members and naive ones. The carriers are old individuals, traces and records.
- Possibilities: A store keeps earlier outcomes reachable, which Phase Space describes as stored reachability, and it narrows the present choice to what the past selected. Human action can erase stored decisions without registering them. A fishery that removed older herring disrupted a migration tradition.63 The loss of older elephants probably breaks the transmission of knowledge to younger ones.65 Researchers have therefore asked conservation policy to protect animal cultures as well as numbers.70
- Complications and overlaps. Each store is the product of another style. An inherited rule records earlier selection among variants, a habit records earlier trial and error, and a tradition records earlier copying. A record kept outside the body serves the agent that left it and others as well, so a slime trail is both a memory and a case of stigmergy. The account of continual decision-making calls records in bodies and in surroundings time-prints and contrasts them with symbolic memory,29 so documents and program code need terms of their own. A copier that follows a majority, as the great tits did, takes part in a form of pooling. Materials that learn through local rules keep a record of their training in their own structure.71 One review treats the spread of traditions through social learning in animals, humans and machines together.72
- Controversies and incompatibilities. Researchers dispute whether a fixed rule is a decision at all: the account of continual decision-making excludes rigid stimulus-response mappings and the fixed action patterns of insects.29 The evidence differs in strength between species. An experiment supports the spread of a tradition in great tits,56 and the evidence for elephants remains sparse and indirect.65 Whether plants learn is contested.19 Stored choices fail when the setting changes faster than the store: evolved cues mislead animals in habitats that humans have altered,49 and lock-in binds institutions to earlier choices.52 A stored rule also binds parties that took no part in the earlier decision, which raises the question of who can revise it.
Anticipating and Planning
An agent evaluates outcomes before it acts. Terms in use: planning, model-based control, decision analysis, optimisation, scenario, precaution, robust decision-making, adaptive pathways, active inference, instrumental convergence.
| Style | How one option prevails | Test | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Planning with an internal model | The agent selects an action for an outcome that lies ahead | Offer an item that is useful only later; does the agent select it and keep it? | Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) that cached food where they would be hungry the next morning;73 ravens (Corvus corax) that selected a tool or a token for use up to 17 hours later, in tasks unrelated to food caching;74 programs that search ahead in the game of Go75 |
| Formal analysis | An explicit model, objectives and data yield a ranked choice | Change an input; does the recommended option change as computed? | Decision analysis;35 decision science for conservation;36 systematic conservation planning76 |
| Robust and precautionary choice | The agent prefers options that work across many futures and keeps alternatives open | Compare options across scenarios; is the chosen option adequate in most of them? | Decision-making under deep uncertainty;77 adaptive policy pathways;78 precaution about sentience in uncertain cases79 |
| Active inference | The agent acts to reduce the gap between predicted states and sensed states | Do measured responses match the model's predictions better than rival models do? | Brains (proposed as a general theory);80 plants (proposed);81 cultures of human and rodent cortical neurons connected to a simulated game of Pong, in which the authors report apparent learning within five minutes under feedback that they designed from this theory (contested)82, 83 |
| Convergent instrumental goals | An agent that plans toward almost any final goal adopts the same intermediate goals, among them its own preservation, the integrity of its goals and the acquisition of resources | Give a planning program different final goals; does it seek the same resources and protect itself under each? | Superintelligent agents (proposed)47 |
- Composition.
- Identity: The holder of a model: an animal with a nervous system, an organisation or a program. The style assigns the decision to that holder, and the beings that the model describes take no part unless they have models of their own.
- Functions: anticipation; memory; problem solving; and information seeking.
- Interactions: A plan binds those inside its model, who often cannot answer it.
- Possibilities: Representational in the terms of Design Potential (Private): the agent represents a future state and selects acts toward it. The style reaches conceived futures only, and these are a small part of the admissible ones. A plan covers what its model contains. In a scenario for alpine dingoes (Canis dingo) in 2050, camera traps, collars, drones and a digital twin manage the animals effectively and still leave the animals' own decisions out.84
- Complications and overlaps. Formal analysis is value comparison with an explicit model and written objectives. Robust choice keeps alternatives open and therefore resembles bet-hedging. A program that plays Go joins three families: it searches ahead, it values positions with a learned function, and it learned that function in part from games that it played with itself.75 The cultured neurons in the simulated game could equally appear under trial and error, because the reported learning required closed-loop feedback on the consequences of their activity.82
- Controversies and incompatibilities. Researchers dispute whether choice needs an internal model. One theory describes brains as systems that predict their inputs,80 and the account of continual decision-making states that adaptive choice needs no internal representation.29 Critics had read planning in corvids as an adaptation specific to food caching, and the study of ravens answered with tasks unrelated to caching.74 A published response disputes the claim that neurons in a dish showed intelligence and sentience.83 The proposal of convergent instrumental goals follows from argument, and present programs could test it. A plan fixes one outcome in advance, which conflicts with styles that need room to fail.
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